Low renewal rate is a key challenge facing the sustainability of community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes. While there is a large literature on initial enrolment into such schemes, there is limited evidence on the factors that impede renewal. This article uses longitudinal data to analyse what determines renewal, both 1 year and 2 years after the introduction of three CBHI schemes, which have been operating in rural Bihar and Uttar Pradesh since 2011. We find that initial scheme uptake is $23-24% and that 2 years after scheme operation, only $20% of the initial enrolees maintain their membership. A household's socio-economic status does not seem to play a large role in impeding renewal. In some instances, a greater understanding of the scheme boosts renewal. The link between health status and use of health care in maintaining renewal is mixed. The clearest effect is that individuals living in households that have received benefits from the scheme are substantially more likely to renew their contracts. We conclude that the low retention rates may be attributed to limited benefit packages, slow claims processing times and the gap between the amounts claimed and amounts paid out by insurance.
Introduction
Since the late 1990s, there has been a proliferation of communitybased health insurance (CBHI) schemes in low and middle-income countries (Ekman 2004; Mebratie et al. 2013) . Such schemes bring together individuals from a common background (e.g. geographical, economic and occupational) to set up, own and operate a health insurance scheme on a not-for-profit or profit sharing basis (Dror 2014) . It is based on the principle of risk sharing among the community of
Key Messages
• A household's socio-economic status does not have a large bearing on renewing CBHI membership.
• The link between illness events and use of health care in influencing renewal is mixed.
• Individuals living in households that have received benefits from the schemes are substantially more likely to renew their contracts.
• The low retention rates may be attributed to limited benefit packages and the gap between amounts claimed and amounts paid out by insurance.
V C The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. insured people to provide financial protection against the impoverishing effects of health expenditure (Carrin et al. 2005) . Enrolment in most CBHI schemes is voluntary, typically premiums are low and independent of individual health status (Radermacher and Dror 2006) . There is substantial evidence that being affiliated to CBHI schemes is associated with an increase in health care utilization and some evidence that such schemes provide financial protection in terms of reduced out-of-pocket spending (Panda et al. 2016) . These findings also hold in the Indian context (Devadasan et al. 2004a,b) . At the same time, based on a systematic review of 46 micro-level studies conducted between 1995 and 2012, Mebratie et al. (2013) find that in 11 of 18 studies the lowest-income groups tend to be excluded from CBHI schemes and that in six of nine studies, individuals suffering from chronic health conditions, a proxy for adverse selection, are more likely to enroll as compared with those in good health. Initial uptake in CBHI schemes tends to be low and Mebratie et al. (2013) report an unweighted average uptake rate of 37%.
Although initial uptake is important , scheme sustainability clearly requires renewal of membership. While the literature that has examined renewal is limited (Friedman 2013) , the few studies that have dealt with this issue report a high dropout rate. For instance, in a scheme in Guinea-Conakry, initial enrolment rate was 8% in 1998 which dropped to 6% a year later (Criel and Waelkens 2003) . In a scheme in Burkina Faso, enrolment lay between 5.2% and 6.3% in the years 2004-2006 with a drop-out rate of 30.9% in 2005 and 45.7% in 2006 (Dong et al. 2009 ). In Senegal, for three schemes set up between 1997 and 2001, Mladovsky (2014) reports that in 2009, scheme drop-out rates ranged between 58% and 83%. While low renewal rates appear to be the norm, an exception is the case of a CBHI scheme in Ethiopia which reports a dropout rate of only 18% (Mebratie et al. 2015) . In the Indian context, a scheme operating in Gujarat witnessed a drop-out rate of 49% (Bhat and Jain 2007) , while another scheme in Maharashtra observed a drop-out rate of 67% (Platteau and Ontiveros 2013) .
An assessment of the literature suggests that there are four broad sets of factors that inhibit renewal. These are scheme affordability, the poor quality of care that may be accessed through the scheme, the health status of individuals and information failures, which include poor understanding of insurance in general and insufficient information on how to use the insurance scheme (Panda et al. 2016) . For example, in Guinea-Conakry, scheme affordability and poor quality of care were identified as the main reasons for declining enrolment (Criel and Waelkens 2003) . Another study reports a similar finding in Burkina Faso (Dong et al. 2009) . A recent study in Senegal concluded that episodes of ill-health and active scheme participation increased retention, while a negative perception of quality of care increased scheme dropout (Mladovsky 2014) . In the case of Ethiopia's CBHI scheme, it was found that households that had greater knowledge about the CBHI scheme and those who had actually used services through the scheme were more likely to renew their contracts (Mebratie et al. 2015) .
In the Indian context, low level of awareness about CBHI schemes, affordability, no-claim in the previous term and exclusion of out-patient services from the benefit package were the primary reasons for dropping out (Sinha et al. 2007) . While there are some variations, similar conclusions may be drawn from the experience of micro-health insurance schemes in Gujarat (Bhat and Jain 2007) and Karnataka (Aggarwal 2011) . Most recently, based on a CBHI scheme in Maharashtra, the authors concluded that a better understanding of insurance reduced attrition (Platteau and Ontiveros 2013) . The same study also demonstrated that a better understanding of insurance reduced the negative consequences of not having received pay outs through insurance on renewal.
The current study contributes to the existing literature by analysing the factors that affect renewal decisions in the case of three CBHI schemes operating in rural India, one each in Pratapgarh and Kanpur-Dehat districts of Uttar Pradesh and one in Vaishali district, Bihar. The data allow an analysis of renewal both, 1 year and 2 years after scheme launch. The article focuses on the role played by socio-economic status, scheme use, knowledge and understanding of insurance-both general and scheme-specific and illness events, in influencing renewal.
The article proceeds by providing, in the next section, a description of the three schemes, followed by a description of our analytical framework and a discussion of the data. The subsequent section contains results, while the final section provides a discussion and concludes the study.
Scheme description and uptake
While there are several studies that have examined the impact of CBHI schemes on various outcomes, the majority of them have relied on single or repeated cross-section data (Ekman 2004; Mebratie et al. 2013) . In contrast, each of the schemes in this study has been setup as a clustered randomized control trial (CRCT) with a three-wave implementation process. In addition to the methodological innovation, the aim of the trial was to examine the impact of CBHI schemes which have been designed, and which are administered by the communities themselves and which do not receive financial or technical support from a government or a private provider. While the focus of this article is on factors that determine renewal, estimates of the impact of the program are available in Raza et al. (2016) .
The three CBHI schemes are located in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, two of India's most populated and poorest states. The study sites are rural areas, $50-100 km from the nearest urban centres. The project's target group was defined as households with at least one woman registered as a member of a woman's self-help group (SHG) in March 2010 (when the baseline study was conducted). The target group for the project consisted of 3685 SHG households (1283 in Pratapgarh, 1039 in Kanpur-Dehat and 1363 in Vaishali) representing a total of 24 094 individuals (8852, 6931 and 8311 in Pratapgarh, respectively) .
The 91 study villages were divided into 48 clusters. Clusters were formed by combining contiguous villages such that they contained roughly an equal number of . Subsequently, at each site, clusters were randomly assigned to one of the three waves of treatment. In each of the waves, all SHG-affiliated households within the selected clusters were offered an opportunity to join the scheme. By the end of the project, the entire target population had been offered a chance to join (for details see, Doyle et al. 2011) .
At all locations, the project was implemented by the Delhi-based Micro Insurance Academy (MIA) in co-operation with a local nongovernmental organization which had well-established relations with the SHGs. The three-field partners were BAIF (Bharatiya Agro Industries Foundation) in Pratapgarh, Shramik Bharti in KanpurDehat and Nidan in Vaishali. The implementation process followed MIA's 17-step model that includes awareness building, insurance education, initial package design and premium-pricing based on information obtained from a baseline survey, modification of package design and premium-setting on the basis of interactions with the SHGs during benefit options consultation workshops, and finally training of SHG members to manage the scheme . Following insurance education, the SHG members participated in designing the benefit package through a simulation game called CHAT (Choosing Health-Plans All Together). Once agreement had been reached on a package, households were offered a chance to enrol. All or a subset of household members may enrol in the scheme provided that the household member affiliated to the SHG enrols. Representatives from the NGO and SHG members manage the scheme, collect premiums and help households complete the formalities associated with enrolment.
Details on the benefit package selected at each site are provided in Table 1 . The packages in Pratapgarh and Kanpur-Dehat are similar except that in the first year, SHGs in Pratapgarh did not opt for outpatient coverage. SHGs in Vaishali district opted not to include coverage of inpatient-care but opted for outpatient care and coverage of various diagnostic tests.
1 There are caps on the maximum amounts that may be claimed for inpatient-care and for the use of laboratory and imaging services. There is no limit in terms of using outpatient-care. However, at all three sites such care is provided only by designated practitioners. These designated practitioners are paid on a capitation basis, i.e. they receive a fixed-fee per insured individual per year. The schemes do not have any feature designed to prevent adverse selection and in principle households could select and insure individuals who are more likely to make use of health care. Since there are no copayments, deductibles or limits to the use of outpatient-care, patientinduced over use of outpatient services (moral hazard) is a possibility. In contrast, the capitation fee payment system may provide an incentive to reduce services provided to insured individuals. Following the CRCT design, during the first phase of implementation in 2011, 7722 individuals were offered the possibility of joining the schemes (Table 2) . A year later, the schemes were offered to 6493 individuals (see Annexure I for details). Of the 7722 individuals offered the scheme in the first year, 1806 enrolled (23%). A year later 46% (768 individuals among 1665 resurveyed in 2012 out of 1806) renewed their membership and 2 years later 301 individuals of those who had enrolled in 2011 retained their membership (Table 2 ). There is some variation across the schemes, with renewal rates in 2013 ranging from 13% in Kanpur-Dehat to 21% in Pratapgarh. Among those who were offered the scheme in the second year, the overall enrolment rate was 24% and a year later, only 37% renewed their membership. While there are variations across the schemes in terms of the benefit package, there is no clear indication that one scheme is performing systematically better than others in terms of uptake and renewal. The low initial uptake and high dropout rates in these three CBHI schemes is reminiscent of the patterns observed in other CBHI schemes in India. The low and declining renewal rates despite the efforts that have been put in to involve the community before and after scheme implementation, calls for an analysis of factors that influence the decision to renew membership in the CBHI schemes.
Methodology

Analytical framework
Our aim is to identify the factors that determine scheme renewal. Drawing on the existing literature as well as our knowledge of the context, we focus mainly on the role of four sets of factors in influencing renewal. These are scheme affordability, scheme use, knowledge of insurance and understanding of the scheme, and illness events. We do not have information on the quality of care on offer but control for access to care. Although, not explicitly shown in Equation (1) below, we also control for a range of individual demographic attributes (membership in SHG, age, gender, marital status, relation to the head of household) and whether an individual is a member of the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY).
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We specify the probability that an individual i belonging to household h renews (RENEW ¼ 1) their subscription in time period t as a function of a set of variables in time period tÀ1. Regressing current renewal status on past values of the various sets of covariates allows us to provide estimates that are less likely to be influenced by the endogenous nature of some of the explanatory variables.
A household's ability to afford the scheme is treated as a function of a set of socio-economic characteristics (SES) which includes caste, household size, education and employment status of the household head, the monthly per capita expenditure tertile in which a household falls, and monthly per capita financial liability. Since scheme use (SU) is likely to beget scheme renewal, we include a variable which indicates whether the household to which an individual belongs, has been reimbursed through the scheme in the preceding period. Two indices are constructed to capture knowledge of insurance and understanding of the CBHI scheme (KU). The indices are constructed using responses to six questions related to insurance and seven questions on the concepts and operational aspects of the schemes (for details, see Panda et al. 2015) . Each correct answer is assigned a score of 1 and 0 otherwise. These scores are added to obtain a total score and subsequently dummy variables are used to indicate whether a household has a score above or below average. The role of illness events (IE) in influencing enrolment is captured by the number of episodes of illness experienced during the 30 days preceding the survey-i.e. short-term illness events; the incidence of illnesses whose symptoms have persisted for >30 days preceding the survey-i.e. long-term illness events and the number of times an individual has been hospitalized in the 12 months preceding the survey. These variables provide an indication of the health care needs of individuals and it may be expected that individuals who have experienced illnesses or been hospitalized will be more likely to renew insurance. Access to care (AC) is proxied by the time taken to reach the nearest available source of in-patient and out-patient care. Definitions of the variables included in the specification are contained in Annexure II and descriptive statistics are in Table 3 .
Thus, the probability of renewing membership in the CBHI schemes may be written as:
Marginal effects based on a logit specification of Equation (1) are estimated for each of the three schemes separately and also for the pooled data. We provide three sets of estimates of Equation (1). These correspond to individuals who joined the schemes in 2011 and renewed or dropped out in 2012 (or those who joined in 2012 and renewed or dropped out in 2013) and those who stayed in the scheme for 2 years, i.e. joined in 2011 and renewed/dropped out in 2013. Estimates for those who were followed for 1 year are in Table 4 and those who were followed for 2 years in Table 5 . Instead of estimating a logit model for each of these sub-samples, at least for those who joined the scheme in 2011, it is possible to estimate an ordered logit model to estimate the probability of staying in the scheme for 1, 2 or 3 years. However, such an Notes: The figures in bold indicate the sample used to carry out the econometric analysis. These are as follows: (1) Monthly per capita financial liability 256 (407) 448 (957) 363 (905) 344 (792) 298 (699) 539 (855) 565 (749) 474 (775) 245 (322) 491 (661) 403 (446) 370 (462) Household size approach is restrictive as the role played by different variables in determining renewal may change over time. Hence, we persist with a standard logit model.
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Data and descriptive statistics
Analysis of the factors that determine renewal is based on combining information from three household surveys with information on enrolment, renewal, premium payments and claims from MIA's Management Information System (MIS). We also draw upon qualitative interviews with 33 households who had enrolled in the scheme for at least 1 year. The three household surveys were conducted between March and May of 2010, 2012 and 2013. The first survey covered 3685 households of which 3318 were resurveyed in 2012 and 3307 were revisited in 2013. In all, 3034 households were covered in all three survey rounds. The survey gathered information on various socio-economic indicators, including demographic details of each household member, household consumption expenditures and household assets. Data were collected on self-reported illness events for a 30-day recall period and for hospitalization or pregnancy in the 12 months, preceding the survey. Information was also gathered on the treatment sought for illnesses and expenditure incurred. A module was used to obtain information on understanding of insurance and knowledge of the CBHI schemes.
The analysis is based on individuals who enrolled in the scheme in 2011 and in 2012. While we have complete information on the enrolment status of all individuals who enrolled in 2011 and in 2012 from the MIS, due to sample attrition, the household survey does not contain information for a small proportion of such individuals. Thus, the econometric analysis is based on three different samples. These are as follows: (1) Sample-specific descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3 . For the sample which enrolled in 2011, 40% of enrolees belong to scheduled castes/tribes. More than half the enrolees are women (57%), 46% are married and about one-third are members of SHGs. The average enrolee is 24 years old. This may seem low but is due to the large proportion (47%) of children among the enrolees. In terms of educational distribution, 39% are illiterate while 28% have at least secondary education. About two-thirds of the enrolees have above-average understanding of insurance and 56% have above-average understanding of the scheme. It takes almost an hour to reach inpatient-care facilities while outpatient-care is more easily accessible-travel time of $23 min. About one-third of those enrolled in the CBHI schemes in 2011 are also enrolled in RSBY. This figure increases to 58% for those who enrolled in 2012. Apart from the increase in RSBY membership between the 2 years, differences in descriptive statistics between those who enrolled in 2011 and those who enrolled in 2012 are limited. This is not unexpected given the randomized nature of scheme roll-out.
Results
Renewal after experiencing CBHI for 1 year (renewed in 2012, joined in 2011) Across all sites and the sample as a whole, variations in socioeconomic status as captured by caste, household expenditure tertiles, household size or education of the household head, do not influence renewal status. While there is some evidence, in the case of Kanpur-Dehat, that households with greater financial liability are less likely to renew contracts, the overall impression is that renewal is not impeded by scheme affordability. The premiums charged by the scheme range from 0.89% to 1.24% of monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) and were based on discussions with potential beneficiaries. Based on these estimates, it seems that this interaction has led to the setting of affordable premiums (Table 4) . Scheme use as captured by household claim incidence is positively linked to renewal, at least for the full sample and two of the three sites. However, the estimates are not statistically significant. Analysis of claim data information (Annexure III) from the first year of the scheme confirms that claim incidence for individuals who did renew their contracts is higher (15%, 119/768) as compared with those who do not renew (9%, 93/1038). In fact, this is the key difference in terms of scheme experience across the two groups, as the ratio of the amount received to claims is $50% for both groups and the turn-around times are 25 and 27 days for those who renew and do not renew, respectively. Knowledge of insurance and understanding of the CBHI scheme do not have a bearing on renewal.
Given the voluntary nature of the schemes, a concern is the extent to which renewal is driven by illnesses experienced by an individual. For the sample as a whole, none of the three variables used to capture the illness status of an individual have a bearing on renewal. In the case of Pratapgarh, the coefficients indicate that individuals who have experienced illness symptoms for >30 days are 13% more likely to renew their contracts. For the sample as a whole, being hospitalized is not associated with the probability of renewing CBHI.
With regard to the two access variables, there are some variations across sites and in Kanpur-Dehat an increase in the time taken to access outpatient care reduces the attractiveness of insurance. The descriptive statistics show that, on an average, the travel time to access outpatient-care in Vaishali and Pratapgarh lies in the range of 19-23 min while in the case of Kanpur-Dehat the corresponding figure is 32 min. Thus, Kanpur-Dehat is not as well served as the other two schemes and the estimates indicate that reducing the time to access outpatient-care in Kanpur-Dehat by 10 min would work towards increasing renewal by $5 percentage points. The other sites are well served and distance to outpatient-care has no bearing on renewal. For the sample as a whole distance to care is not systematically linked to the probability of renewal.
Renewal after experiencing CBHI for 1 year (renewed in 2013, joined in 2012)
Renewal probability estimates for individuals who were offered and enrolled in the scheme in 2012 are provided in Table 4 . The discussion focuses on notable differences across the two data waves.
Similar to the first year of the scheme, we see that caste has no bearing on enrolment. However, a number of other traits tend to suggest that scheme affordability is more of a challenge for individuals in this data wave. In two of the three sites, individuals in the highest tertile of the consumption distribution are more likely to renew their subscriptions. The effects are large and indicate that in Vaishali individuals in the highest tertile are 18 percentage points more likely to re-enrol while the figure is 32 percentage points in the case of Kanpur-Dehat. Education of the household head is also positively linked to renewal and indicates that for the sample as a whole, secondary education is associated with a 15 percentage point increase in renewal. Given the randomized offering of the insurance schemes these differences are not due to wave-level differences in the socio-economic traits of the individuals to whom insurance is offered. It is more likely that the increasing importance of socioeconomic status is to do with the stricter imposition of scheme rules as the scheme administration gains experience and the schemes mature. 4 The direct effect of scheme use is captured by the coefficients on the incidence of having received benefits through the scheme. The estimates are qualitatively similar to the results based on the first wave but are now much larger. Depending on the site, individuals living in households who have received benefits through the scheme are 19-43 percentage points more likely to renew their contracts. For the sample as a whole the effect is 34.5 percentage points and statistically significant. As shown in the Appendix, there are marked differences in scheme experience across the two groups. The claim incidence for those who renewed is 18% (91/493) versus 5% (54/ 1049) for those who did not renew. For those who renewed the time taken between submission of claim and receipt of funds is 19 days while it is 27 days for those who did not renew. 5 The ratio of the amount of money received through the insurance and the amount claimed is 33% for those who renewed and 23% for those who did not. 6 These figures are also much lower than the 50% money received to claim ratio in the first data wave. The gap in the share of claims honoured across the two groups illustrates the growing importance of this aspect in determining renewal status. Across all sites, both, insurance knowledge and a greater understanding of the insurance scheme are associated with a higher probability of renewing contracts. For the sample as a whole, those with greater understanding of insurance are 8 percentage points more likely to renew contracts while for CBHI understanding the effect is $14 percentage points. Similar to the claims effects discussed earlier, in the second wave the importance of knowledge and understanding in determining enrolment is substantially higher. Individuals in both waves are similar in terms of their socio-economic status, and have experienced the same set of awareness activities. Hence, it is likely that the changing importance of these variables over time arises due to the greater need to comply with scheme regulations as the schemes mature.
With regard to the illness-related indicators, for all three illnesses, long-term, short-term and hospitalization, the coefficients for the full sample indicate that such events lead to a reduction in the probability of renewing contracts. In some instances, as in Vaishali for short-term illnesses, there is a positive link. However, perhaps the intriguing aspect is that the coefficient on the use of inpatient care is statistically significant and indicates that having been hospitalized in the year that an individual was insured leads to a reduction in the probability of renewal. According to the estimates, those who perhaps have had the most need to rely on insurance are 15 percentage points less likely to renew their membership.
Determinants of renewal after experiencing CBHI for 2 years
This section focuses on the determinants of renewal for those individuals who have been in the CBHI scheme for two consecutive years (joined in 2011, renewed in 2012, and then renewed/dropped out in 2013), i.e. individuals who enrolled in the scheme in 2011. Given the high dropout rates, we are unable to estimate the specification for Kanpur-Dehat. Estimates for the two other sites and the full sample are in Table 5 . Consistent with the discussion in the previous section, there is no evidence that socio-economic status deters enrolment. In fact, for the sample as a whole, schedule caste/tribe individuals are more likely to renew their memberships. Once again, the importance of claims in determining renewal is clear. Individuals who have received benefits through the scheme are 32 percentage points more likely to renew. Understanding of the scheme and knowledge of insurance are positively linked to scheme renewal but are not statistically significant. The pattern of coefficients on the illness-related variables matches what has been seen earlier. Hospitalization is negatively associated with renewal probability although not statistically significant and the number of short-term illnesses increases the probability of renewal.
Discussion and conclusion
Retaining members in voluntary community-based health insurance schemes is challenging and only a handful of studies have examined renewal in such schemes. This study contributed by examining the factors that determine renewal 1 year and 2 years after enrolling in one of three CBHI schemes located in rural India. Similar to other papers, we found low uptake and renewal rates. On an average, across the three schemes, which are located in Pratapgarh and Kanpur-Dehat districts in Uttar Pradesh and in Vaishali district in Bihar, initial enrolment was 23% in 2011 and by 2013 only 17% of those who had enrolled in 2011 retained membership. We examined the role of four sets of factors in determining renewal, namely, scheme affordability, scheme use, knowledge of insurance and understanding of the scheme, and recent illness episodes.
Scheme affordability was measured by differences in renewal status across socio-economic groups. Among those who were offered insurance in 2011 and could renew in 2012 and 2013, we found no link between economic status and retention. In fact retention rates seemed to be positively associated with belonging to a schedule caste/tribe. For those who were offered insurance in 2012 and renewed in 2013, we found stronger economic status effects, with those in the richest tertile more likely to renew their membership. However, the overall impression emerging from the estimates was that differences in socioeconomic status as captured by caste, education and consumption tertiles does not have a very large bearing on renewal. While this is perhaps not surprising as the premium for the benefit package and its composition were determined in consultation with the target group, it is different from the bulk of the literature which tends to find evidence of social exclusion (Mebratie et al. 2013) .
Scheme use, defined in terms of whether anyone in a household had claimed benefits in the year prior to renewal was found to be positively associated with scheme retention. The importance of this effect increased over time and among those who renewed for a second year the marginal effect of this variable was 32 percentage points. The claims data also illustrated the role of scheme use, speed of processing claims and the extent to which claims are honoured in determining retention. Households whose claims took longer to process and who received a lower amount of money as compared with the claims they made were less likely to renew.
Similar to scheme use, there was some evidence that over time there is increasing importance of knowledge of insurance and a better understanding of the scheme in contributing to scheme retention. The launch of the CBHI schemes was preceded by awareness activities which explained the concept of insurance and the specifics of the CBHI scheme. Depending on the sample, between 66% and 73% of households had an above average understanding of insurance and it is likely that the relatively high understanding of insurance explains the lack of a clear effect as well as the difference with other papers in the literature which highlight the importance of insurance knowledge in reducing dropout (Platteau and Ontiveros 2013). 7 In the case of CBHI schemes, there is considerable evidence that individuals with poor health conditions are more likely to enrol (see Mebratie et al. 2013) . In this study, we found mixed evidence on the link between short-term illness events in influencing retention. For those who renewed their contracts for 2 years, it was clear that their decision to renew depended on experiencing such events. For the sample as a whole, we found that experiencing a short-term illness event increased the probability of renewal by 7 percentage points. For those who renewed after 1-year short-term illness did not play a role. The increasing importance of short-term illness in influencing renewal over time may perhaps raise concerns about adverse selection. However, the link between hospitalization and retention suggests that such concerns are not well-founded and perhaps there should be greater concern about the insurance product on offer and scheme administration. The estimates showed that those who had been hospitalized, and who should have found the insurance product most useful were less likely to renew their contracts. While this effect was statistically significant for the sample as a whole only for one set of estimates, it was negative for all three sets of estimates. There could be several reasons for this. First, the quality of care on offer that is accessible through the scheme may be poor. While this may be true in general, the scheme does not restrict the use of hospital care to specific facilities and so it is unlikely that poor quality of care offered through the scheme affects renewal behaviour. It could be that the cap of Rs. 4000 in Pratapgarh and of Rs. 3000 in Kanpur-Dehat (see Table, 1, Year II) are too low and potential clients, despite having played a role in determining the package, find that the product on offer is not suitable. The claims data support this argument as the average claim among those who enrolled in 2012 and dropped out in 2013 is Rs. 6538 while it is Rs. 2998 among those who renewed (see Annexure III). 8 The third possibility is that, by definition, those who have been hospitalized are more likely to have engaged with the scheme administration in terms of attempting to claim benefits. Their experience in terms of the gap between their expectations and the amount they received from the insurance (on an average, as shown in Annexure III, the receipt to claim ratio is 25%) may have spurred their decision to leave the scheme. For the use of outpatient consultation services individuals do not need to file claims which may also explain, in some cases, the positive link between short-term illnesses and renewal probabilities. Although there are differences across the three schemes in terms of the benefit packages, we do not find a systematic link between uptake/renewal and the package on offer. This is perhaps not unexpected as the schemes were chosen by the communities rather than imposed, Furthermore, the impact of the scheme on health-care utilization is found to be zero (Raza et al. 2016) , suggesting that consumer-induced moral hazard is not a concern. In contrast, on the basis of interviews with 33 households who had enrolled in the scheme for at least 1 year, we found that 16 of them had to pay for outpatient services which should have been covered by the insurance and 10 of them had dropped out citing the poor quality of services offered by outpatient providers. Since the providers were selected in consultation with the community it is unlikely that the designated providers fall short of the standards offered by alternatives. It is, however, possible that the payment system which offers an annual fixed fee per insured individual provides an incentive to lower the quality of care offered to insured patients.
In terms of policy lessons, the findings suggest that the systematic and interactive scheme implementation process involving MIA, NGOs and SHG members has led to the creation of an affordable product and led to high levels of understanding of insurance. This approach is perhaps an example for similar schemes which may be implemented in India or internationally. At the same time the low initial enrolment rate and low rates of retention in the schemes explored in this article, suggests that schemes, which are entirely community-financed and community-managed and which offer limited benefit packages do not meet the needs of the targeted population. In short, such schemes are affordable, but not desirable. Alternative approaches which involve communities but also governments and/or private companies are worth investigating, such as the Yeshasvini scheme in India (Aggarwal 2011) or the approaches used in Rwanda and Ethiopia, where the community is involved but governments play a prominent role in financing and managing schemes (Mebratie et al. 2015) .
The study has several limitations. First, the number of sitespecific observations restricts power, second the focus on SHG-affiliated households hinders generalizability, and finally, the explanations provided for the unexpected effect of illness-events are tentative. Notwithstanding these limitations, the article does show that despite some positive features, in order to remain viable, the CBHI schemes of the type analysed in this article need additional support, both financial and institutional.
